Sporting Diplomacy in Colombian Society and Politics: “Soft Power” and Football

Note: I recently wrote a piece about Football’s role in Colombian Society. It is not directly linked to corruption.

Colombia has a rich football (soccer) history, deeply intertwined with society and politics. Starting in the 1930s, around the time of the first World Cup, Colombia did not have the recognized teams or facilities, nor the popularity, for the game that it would have in successive years. By the 1980s, there was an explosion in football’s popularity, partly spurred by the drug lord Pablo Escobar, who invested millions in football infrastructure to improve his image. Politics, too, played a role in “soft power” influence; in the most recent election, the right-wing candidate Abelardo De La Espriella cloaked himself in the national football jersey in a bid to win support from fans. Football continues to be linked to efforts to influence public opinion in society and politics.

A Brief History of Football in Colombia

Football’s growth as a mainstream sport in Colombia began to accelerate during the 1930s, as improving economic conditions and government funding for public works projects allowed for the development of football stadiums. By 1938, Colombia’s rising football reputation allowed it to host the Bolivarian Games, a FIFA-sanctioned event between Colombia and its South American neighbors (Blakeslee, 2026). After World War II, the newly formed Colombian football league became a desirable destination for many players, particularly players who had emigrated to Argentina from Italy, because of the higher salaries in Colombia; in 1948, the Argentine Football Association (AFA) instituted a maximum salary of 1500 Pesos (at the time, was $350), thus many players decided to move to Colombia, where there were no such restrictions (Blakeslee, 2026).

Pablo Escobar and His Role in Colombian “Narcoball”

By the 1980s, Pablo Escobar and his Medellin drug cartel played a prominent, if infamous, role in Colombian society. Born in 1948 to a middle-class family in rural Colombia, his father to run his farm, and Pablo was sent to live with his grandmother in Medellin. While studying political science there at Universidad de Antioquia, a need to pay tuition fees drove the young Escobar into drug dealing. In the 1970s, he formed the Medellín cartel and became successful very quickly; by 1989, Escobar was listed seventh on Forbes Magazine’s list of billionaires, with a reported fortune of $20 billion. His wealth was such that he could afford these expenditures, despite what his brother Roberto, his accountant, said: the cartel was forced to write off 10 percent of earnings each year “due to spoilage such as water damage, rodents or simply misplacing the cash” (Allen, 2015).

During his rise to riches, Escobar had gained cult-like status as a Robin Hood-type figure among many Colombians in Medellin, particularly the working class, as he built houses, football pitches, and other infrastructure projects to help them (Allen, 2015). Escobar organized all-star matches featuring teams of the country’s best players. He then invested further in football by buying his local Medellin club, Atlético Nacional (Allen, 2015). Nacional’s rise in the late 1980s was fueled solely by vast amounts of laundered drug money, and the concept of Narco football was born.

In 1993, Pablo Escobar died in a shootout with the Colombian National Police; with his death, the ironclad grip that Pablo Escobar had on the criminal underworld there ended, creating a massive power vacuum and infighting among drug cartel rivals. At this same time, some of the best players in South America played in the Colombian league, and the national team qualified for the U.S.-hosted 1994 World Cup. The captain of the Colombian team, Andres Escobar (no relation to Pablo), known as El Caballero del Fútbol (the Gentleman of Football), was much loved by his teammates (Glendenning, 2018). In the second group match between Colombia and the U.S. team, Andrés Escobar conceded an unfortunate own goal that ultimately knocked Colombia out of the tournament. Shortly after the team returned home, Andres Escobar went out to a nightclub in Medellin with friends, despite being warned of the potential threats to his life, and Escobar was fatally shot (Glendenning, 2018). It was widely assumed that henchmen loyal to the now-deceased Pablo Escobar were behind the attack. This is yet another sad example of how football and crime are intertwined in Colombian society.

Football and Politics in Colombia

In August of 2022, after years of right-wing leadership, leftist politician Gustavo Petro came to power, intent on implementing wide-scale reforms to the education and healthcare systems, rebalancing the unequal distribution of income, and tax reforms that would benefit the worst off in society (Meyer, 2024). However, Petro’s right-wing opponents succeeded in setting up legislative and judicial roadblocks to prevent him from passing his widespread reforms—the entrenched right-wing political establishment.

In the June 2026 election, between the left-wing candidate Ivan Cepeda and the right-wing candidate Abelardo De la Espriella, Trump’s backing increased De la Espriella’s chances (Correal, 2026). In addition, Espriella cloaked himself in the yellow of the Colombian national football team jersey to garner populist support (Zea, 2026). According to Correal in the New York Times, Espriella won the election on June 21 by a razor-thin margin against Cepeda.

Conclusion

Colombian football, as in other countries, impacts society. De La Espriella, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and other leaders throughout the world, used football as a vehicle to boost his political standing. Pablo Escobar, a drug lord, used his money to fund football and increase the popularity of football in the country, which also helped to influence his reputation positively. As I write this, the Colombian national team has qualified for the knockout phase of this year’s World Cup. If they advance, we can expect others in Colombia to attach themselves to football as a way of currying favor through sporting diplomacy.

Works Cited

Allen, Jamie. “Pablo Escobar and the Narco-Fútbol Years.” These Football Times, May 30, 2015. https://thesefootballtimes.co/2015/05/30/pablo-escobar-narco-futbol/

Blakeslee, Brandon. “An Age of Piracy or a Golden Era: An Economic History of Colombian Football from Obscurity to International Notoriety, 1918-1954.” Fast Capitalism 23, no. 1, June 16, 2026. https://doi.org/10.32855/1930-014x.1513

Correal, Annie. “Trump Called Iván Cepeda a ‘Radical Left Marxist.’ Can He Be Colombia’s President? – The New York Times.” New York Times, June 20, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/20/world/americas/ivan-cepeda-colombia-president-election.html

Glendenning, Barry. “World Cup Stunning Moments: Andrés Escobar’s Deadly Own Goal | Colombia | The Guardian.” The Guardian, April 3, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2014/mar/25/world-cup-moments-andres-escobar-death

Meyer, Sara. “Visionary or Dreamer? Colombia’s President Put to the Test – BTI Blog.” BTI Transformation Index, December 5, 2024. https://blog.bti-project.org/2024/12/05/visionary-or-dreamer-colombias-president-put-to-the-test/ Zea , Tibisay. “In Colombia, a Soccer Jersey Gets Caught up in Politics amid World Cup – Csmonitor.Com.” Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2026. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2026/0617/colombia-world-cup-soccer-jersey-de-la-espriella-cepeda-petro?icid=rss

Polish Government Seeking the Extradition of Ziobro from the U.S.

The Polish Government announced that it was seeking the extradition of its former justice minister, Zbigniew Ziobro, from Hungary to the U.S According to a report in The Guardian, Ziobro is facing allegations of diverting funds meant to go towards victims of crime to his own personal interests. In particular, Ziobro is accused of buying the controversial Israeli software Pegasus to listen in on his political opponents. Ziobro was being sheltered in Hungary by the now former president Viktor Orban. It is an open question whether Ziobro will actually face justice back in Poland.

Cherfilus-McCormick Resigns Before Congressional Investigation.

Last week, Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick, a Democratic representative from Florida, resigned before an investigation into her allegedly embezzling $5 million in disaster relief funds to fund her 2021 Congressional campaign. According to a report in the New York Times, McCormick used the five million from FEMA, which was supposed to help register people for vaccines during COVID. Instead, she used most of the money to fund her campaign and the rest for personal use. Despite resigning from Congress, she is still facing federal criminal charges and could spend up to 53 years in prison. It is unclear what will happen next, but it is not a great look for the democrats, who are trying to highlight corruption on the other side of the aisle.

Orban’s defeat continues to Cause Political Ripples Both Domestically and internationally.

On Sunday, Viktor Orban, who had been Prime Minister of Hungary for 16 years, was heavily defeated by the upstart candidate Peter Magyar. Orban’s Fidesz party was reduced to only 55 seats in the 199-seat Parliament, allowing Magyar’s Tisza to have a supermajority to hopefully undo the most extreme excesses of the Orban era. According to a report in the Guardian, Hungarians were fed up with the stagnant economy and woeful healthcare and education systems that have been neglected for far too long. As for Peter Magyar, he is an interesting figure in Hungarian politics. He was an Orbán loyalist for many years, but he broke with the government over a scandal relating to the pardoning of a government official who covered up years of abuse at a state-run children’s home. According to a report by PBS, Magyar wants parliament to transfer power on May 5^th; whether that happens is up for debate.

Former Ghana Finance Minister Bids for Permanent Residence in the U.S.

The former Ghanaian finance minister, Ken Ofori-Atta, who is facing corruption charges back in Ghana, is attempting to gain permanent residency in the United States. According to a report by the website Semafor, Ofori-Atta was detained by ICE agents in January for overstaying his visa. During Ofori-Atta’s tenure, he was accused of awarding public contracts to Databank, a company he co-founded, and of allegedly misusing state funds. As of right now, the Ghanaian government is pursuing extradition proceedings against Ofori Atta. Who knows what will happen next, but somehow I wouldn’t be surprised if Ofori-Atta gets his freedom in this country, but at a price.

Tensions Grow Between Ukraine and Hungary.

Tensions between Hungary and Ukraine have increased today. This is due to Hungarian authorities seizing $90 million in funds from Ukraine’s state savings bank Oschadbank, as well as 9 KGs of gold. According to a report in the BBC, the money and gold were destined for Austria, which has been a regular occurrence since the start of the war. However, the Hungarian authorities stated that this shipment was seized due to money-laundering concerns. The six Ukrainian bank workers who were accompanying the shipment were released today after successful diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. It seems rich from Hungary to claim that this shipment of money could have been involved in money laundering; Hungary isn’t exactly known as a paragon for anti-corruption. It seems much more likely that Orban, who is facing a tricky election next month, is trying to whip up anti-Ukrainian sentiment for his own political gains.

Anti-Corruption Protests Erupt in Albania.

Last weekend, a series of Anti-Corruption protests erupted in Albania’s capital, Tirana. Albania has been trying to innovate in its fight against endemic corruption. According to a report in Al-Jazeera, police used water cannons and tear gas against the protestors, while in return the protesters lobbed Molotov Cocktails at the police. The protestors aim to force Prime Minister Edi Rama to resign. According to a report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the Albanian Anti-Corruption organization known as SPAK opened criminal proceedings against Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku. She was allegedly interfering in public procurement processes for the construction of the Llogara Tunnel in Southern Albania to favor certain companies. It is unclear whether or not the prime minister or the deputy prime minister will ever face justice.

Former Ukrainian Minister Arrested at Border.

Earlier this week, the former Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Haluschenko was arrested at the Ukrainian border attempting to flee the country. Haluschenko is deeply involved in the growing Ukrainian energy scandal, which has also implicated several of President Zelensky’s closest advisors. According to a report in the Washington Post, Haluschenko was arrested on a train at the Ukrainian-Polish border and charged with money laundering and participation in a criminal organization. This case is particularly relevant because Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been severely impacted by relentless Russian bombing. This story is far from being done. I have a feeling that many more high-profile names will be implicated.

Police Corruption Probe Rocks Toronto.

(Disclaimer: This is the Crispin Corruption Report’s 200^th blog post.)

Earlier this week, several Toronto police officers were arrested on several corruption-related charges. According to a report in the BBC, an investigation was triggered when an allegation emerged that police officers attempted to murder a prison officer at his house in May of last year. As the investigation proceeded, it came to light that several of the accused officers were also in the business of trafficking Cannabis and Fentanyl. At the center of the case was Constable Timothy Barnhardt, according to a report in the New York Times. Barnhardt allegedly obtained the prison officer’s address from the internal police database. He also illegally obtained the addresses of businesses that were later robbed or extorted by organized criminal elements in Toronto. This appears to be a wide-ranging scandal that isn’t going to end anytime soon.

Mexican Security Chief Tangled in Complex Cartel Web.

(Note: The following events detailed in this article occurred last year, going to 2019. This is also a very complex story.)

Back in 2019, a gentleman named Trindad Alberto de la Cruz Miranda (otherwise known as El Pelon de Playas, translated as “the bald man of the beaches”) was arrested. At the time, he was the head of the notorious Los Zetas cartel in the state of Tabasco in Southeast Mexico. Immediately, the new secretary of security in Tabasco, Hernan Bermudez, was targeted by members of Los Zetas. According to a report in El País, Bermúdez was nominated to the post by Tabasco governor Adán Augusto López. Not long after Bermudez took over as Security chief, it emerged that he was the head of La Barredora, a regional branch of the New Generation cartel based in the state of Jalisco.

On December 4^th, 2020, the criminal scene in Tabasco shifted dramatically when two gentlemen known by their aliases as Pantera (Panther) and Toro (Bull), who were involved in widespread stealing of fuel (a common criminal pursuit in Tabasco), executed someone who went by the Alias Kalimba, who had close ties to Los Zetas. Consequently, Pantera and Toro assumed Kalimba’s old fuel smuggling territory. Shortly after that, in 2021, the Mexican Ministry of Defense finally named Bermudez as the head of a massive criminal enterprise. As of September 2025, there was a report from the AP that Bermudez fled to Paraguay with the intention of setting up a criminal enterprise there. However, shortly after he arrived, he was arrested and extradited to Mexico to face charges of criminal association, extortion, and kidnapping. If you have to go to the police in Mexico, you have two problems.